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The complexity ofthe incometax isanunendingsourceofcomplaintCompliance costs
have received increasingattentionandare estimated tobe large. Yet most recognizethat some
degree of complexity is necessary ii ability to pay is to be measured accurately. This article
presents a framework for analyzing the value of greater aecuracy in income taxation.
Formulations for both distributive and incentive benefits ofaccuracyareoffered. The question
whether taxpayers have excessive or inadequate incentives to acquire information about taxable







Developed countries use income taxes rather than uniform head taxes to
collect much of their revenue.' A very high price is paid for this choice: an
income tax distorts economic activity, and administrative and compliance costs
are incurred. The magnitude of each element is estimated to be on the order
of tens of billions of dollars in the United States.2 This price is thought
to be justified by the more desirable distribution of after-tax income than
would result with a head tax. Questions of accuracy and complexity of the
income tax involve, to a significant extent,3 choosing where the tax system
should be along the continuum that ranges from no attempt to measure ability
to pay (a head tax or a purely random levy) to a perfect measure of income (as
is assumed in conventional analysis of optimal income taxation).' Thus, the
problem encompasses major design issues, such as the choice between linear and
nonlinear income taxation, and countless particulars, such as depreciation
rules, itemized deductions, and regulations governing the time at which income
and expenses are accrued.
This article addresses two topics that have received relatively little
attention in the literature. In section 2, a framework is developed for
analyzing how accurate an income tax should be.5 Using simple models and a
1 Variants of sales taxes and wealth taxes are analogous to an income tax for
present purposes. Some property and excise taxes are like user fees to a
substantial extent, thereby raising different issues with regard to accuracy.
2 See, e.g., Browning (1981) and Slemrod and Sorum (1984). As Yitzhaki
(1979) has noted, a head tax would involve administrative costs in determining
whether an individual could pay it, but such costs would be far less than
those involved in determining the income level of all individuals.
Other aspects of complexity, such as its effect on tax avoidance activity,
are not examined here. Also, it is not necessarily the case that a more
complex set of rules will lead to greater compliance costs, as it is possible
that more complex rules will deter more expensive forms of transactions that
would arise if rules were simpler.
See, e.g. •Mirrlees(1971). Of course, a primary justification for taxing
income is that it is the best available proxy for ability, which is even more
difficult to measure. See Stern (1982).
Prior discussions of complexity and the income tax include Bradford (1986)
and Sleerod (1984). Such work does not offer formulations for the benefits of
a more accurate income tax. Stern (1982) examines the value of accuracy in
administering lump-sum taxes that vary with ability in a model in which income
taxation is implicitly assumed to involve no mismeasurement.utilitarian social welfare function, two benefits of accuracy are examined.
First, a more accurate income tax indeed improves the resulting distribution
of income. (Thus, greater accuracy means that it is more likely that high-
income individuals pay high taxes and low-income individuals pay low taxes.)
It is demonstrated that this benefit can be measured by a risk premium: if
individuals with a given actual income might be taxed too much or too little,
the distributive benefit is measured by the amount such individuals would be
willing to pay for insurance to avoid being exposed to the risk of paying the
wrong amount of tax. This measure is appropriate even when the actual
situation does not involve risk per se --thatis, when individuals know ex
ante whether they will be winners or losers on account of inaccuracy.
Second, a more accurate income tax tends to reduce the distortion of
economic activity. This result holds when individuals, at the time they
choose their level of effort, are aware of how their income will be
mismeasured. When net income is overstated (at the margin), individuals work
less; when it is understated, they work more. Both changes in behavior would
be inefficient were it not for the preexisting labor-leisure distortion that
results from the existence of an income tax relative to a totally inaccurate
system that makes no attempt to measure ability to pay.6 Nonetheless,
inaccuracy adds to the familiar labor-leisure distortion: when deadweight loss
rises disproportionately with the effective tax rate, errors that result in a
higher effective tax rate cause more distortion than is avoided by errors that
result in a lower effective tax rate.
The subject of section 3 is whether taxpayers' incentives to acquire
information about their taxable income and dispute government assessments are
excessive or inadequate.1 This problem is important because enacting a more
6Yitzhaki(1979) examines a different respect in which a more accurate
(comprehensive) tax system can reduce economic distortion; including a wider
range of economic activity in the tax base reduces distortion between taxed
and untaxed activity.
This subject has received little attention in the tax context, despite the
existence of work on taxpayer uncertainty and tax advice. Scotchmer (1989)
offers the conjecture that the private and social interest coincideexcept in
the litigation context, where whatever problem thatmay exist is the same as
in other legal settings.precise (and often more complicated) tax system does not automatically result
in the intended distribution of tax burdens, because individualsmay not know
all relevant details of the tax law and will not always be induced to learn
them; nor will the government always correctly assess tax liability.
Moreover, the compliance costs of various tax rules depend on the extent of
taxpayer efforts that are induced. Such efforts may not be optimal, which
affects the desirability of tax rules and suggests that corrective action
designed to alter individuals' incentives to undertake compliance efforts be
considered.
Three settings are considered in examining the appropriateness of
individuals' incentives to acquire information about their taxable income.
First, individuals may acquire information about the taxable income arising
from different activity choices before they decide upon labor effort. What
they learn will affect their effort and thus the taxes they pay. Because
individuals care only about after-tax income and not government revenue, their
private benefit from information may diverge from its social value. When
individuals learn more about their true income (and thereby their taxable
income), such a divergence may exist but there is no a priori reason to
believe it is in a particular direction. But when information concerns not
their true income but idiosyncrasies in the tax system's measurement thereof,
there is a tendency for private incentives to be excessive.8
Second, information may be acquired after choices affecting true income
have been made --thatis, solely to aid in preparing a tax return. Most
obviously, such information will reduce the enforcement risk that taxpayers
bear. Because risk is a social cost, the private and social values of
information will tend to be equal on this account. But in many plausible
instances, informed taxpayers will pay less tax on average than if uninformed
(for example, informed taxpayers would never mistakenly overstate their
These results are similar to those concerning legal advice about harm-
causing activities. See ICaplow and Shavell (1992). The reasoning, however,
differs in important respects. Notably, when sanctions are perfect,
individuals' behavior tends to be efficient when they are informed, whereas
taxes distort behavior relative to what it would be were individuals unaware
of the law.
-3-income). In such cases, the private benefit from becoming informed will
exceed the social benefit, leading to excessive expenditures on such
information.
Third, taxpayers may expend resources to demonstrate to the tax authority
that they have been overassessed. Their incentives to expend resources in
this context are excessive when the effect is solely distributive. But the
prospect of overassessnent may be anticipated, in which case ex post
expenditures to nullify erroneous assessments may affect ex ante behavior. In
particular, work effort may increase which in turn increases tax revenue, a
benefit taxpayers do not take into account. Thus, it is possible for
taxpayers' incentives to be inadequate, although it tax rates have been set
optimally incentives tend to be excessive when errors are small.
Section 4 discusses how the present analysis is relevant to tax policy,
how it relates to the primary sources of inaccuracy in income taxation, and
how employing welfare criteria more egalitarian than utilitarianism would
affect the results.
2. The Value ofAccuracy
It is useful to begin with separate analyses of distributive and incentive
effects of •inaccuracy. A brief discussion of the interaction of the two
effects concludes the section.
2.1. Distribution
Assume that individuals have identical concave utility functions 13 of
differing (exogenously determined) incomes y. Income is subject to a
proportional tax at rate t.
Prior literature has emphasized how uncertainty increases expected revenue
and that it might increase welfare, rather than the possible divergence
between the private and social value of information to resolve the
uncertainty, which is the focus here. See, e.g., Abs (1988), Beck and Jung
(1989), Scotchmer (1989), Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989). (Also, these models
have penalties for underreporting and no rewards for overreporting -- which
produces many of the results -- whilecases both with and without rewards are
considered here.)
.4.In the case of inaccuracy, the government observes y + e, where e has




If the government makes the expenditure necessary to achieve accuracy,'°
expected utility is
(2) EU(y) —U[(l-t)y).
Comparing (I) and (2). it is apparent that the monetary equivalent of the
amount by which expected utility with accuracy exceeds that without accuracy
is simply the risk premium associated with an individual of income y being
exposed to the lottery -te (a lottery with a mean of zero).
Remarks: (a) It is not surprising that the social cost of inaccuracy
corresponds to a risk premium. Viewed ex ante, inaccuracy exposes taxpayers
to the risk that they will pay the wrong amount of tax. Expenditures on
accuracy can be seen as providing insurance, which would be desirable as long
as the administrative cost does not exceed the risk premium." Note, however,
that this need not be insurance in the conventional sense, for the argument
holds even if taxpayers know from the beginning their true level of income and
the error that will be made in measuring it.12 In that case, expression (1)
would give the average utility of all taxpayers with actual income of y under
an inaccurate system. The per capita benefit of accuracy, measured in
dollars, would still equal the risk premium.
For simplicity, costs are assumed to be borne by the government. If borne
by individuals, one could adjust the tax function accordingly to achieve the
same result. Also, accuracy is taken to be all-or nothing, rather than a
matter of degree. The qualitative results are unaffected; the benefit of
accuracy, described below, would simply be the reduction in the risk premium
rather than its elimination.
Private insurance would be superior if insurance companies could observe
true income more cheaply than the government, which seems implausible in this
context.
12 The formal equivalence to insurance is restored if one imagines taxpayers
behind a veil of ignorance, unaware of the particular error that will be made
In measuring their income. See Harsanyi (1953).
.5-An cx post perspective might emphasize that equals are treated unequally
when income is measured inaccurately, a problem usually characterized as
horizontal inequity. In this example, horizontal inequity can be understood
as way to talk about risk-bearing costs. Equivalently, one could view this
dimension of risk as involving a loss of vertical equity.13 The after-tax
income distribution in the inaccurate regime can be derived from that in the
accurate regime by adding a random component to each individual's income.
Thus, the income distribution in the inaccurate regime involves greater
dispersion, less vertical equity. If the social welfare function is
utilitarian, the monetary equivalent of the loss in welfare will be measured
by individuals' risk premiums, as previously described.'4
(b) It is not optimal for the government to collect a tax of t(y+e) when
it observes y+e, as was assumed in the model. First, given the income level
it does observe, the government could make a Bayesian inference concerning the
true y. using its knowledge of the underlying distribution of y and e.
Second, the optimal tax to impose would not generally equal t times the mean
of the estimated y, but rather a somewhat higher or lower figure to account
for the fact chat the individual's actual income may differ from the mean. To
take these considerations into account, one could allow e to be a function of
y and interpret e(y) not as representing a raw observation, but rather what
results after these complications are taken into account.
(c) The value of accuracy may depend on income. If absolute risk
aversion is decreasing, the value of accuracy will be greater for low-income
individuals. But if the magnitude of errors rises with income, greater
precision would be more valuable for high-income individuals. Moreover, if
13 This coincidence of horizontalinequity and concern for risk or vertical
equity is discussed in Kaplow (1989).
' Because the optimal incometax involves incomplete redistribution,
deviations from the tax burdens specified by the optimal tax in principle
involve the problem of the second best. Indeed, measurement errors that
involve high-income individuals paying more tax or low-income individuals
paying less tax improve welfare (abstracting from any incentive effects). The
risk premium includes this, and thus completelycaptures the relevant welfare effects.(As with an actuarially fair gamble, some of the outcomes are good
but it is unambiguous that the prospect as a whole is not.)
-6-high-income individuals face higher marginal tax rates, a given error in
measurement would have a greater effect on the taxes they pay.
2.2. Incentives
Suppose that an individual who expends labor effort 2 is able to produce
net income of y(l), where y' > 0, y < 0.(Net income equals gross earnings
minus the costs of producing income; thus, an overestimate of taxable income
might arise by underestimating expenses.) To focus on incentives alone, let
utility equal y(2)(l-t) -2.Individuals' first-order condition for their
choice of 2 is
(3) Y' —
Thereduction in effort when t> 0 isthe familiar labor-leisure distortion.
Now assume that the government observes net income with some error e. It
is assumed that the distribution of the error is given by f(e.y) --thatis,
the extent of error may depend on the actual income one earns.
Case of error that individuals cannot predict. If the government observes
net income with some error and individuals cannot predict the error but know
only its distribution, all that matters is how the expected value of the error
depends on income. (This is because the stipulated utility function entails
risk neutrality.) Thus, if the error is unbiased or biased but independent of
income, error will have no effect on incentives.
If the error is systematic and increasing with income,15 there will be
further distortion in work effort. If it is decreasing, the labor-leisure
distortion will tend to be offset. In either case, however, it may be
possible to adjust the tax rules to account for systematic error. (E.g., if
high incomes are systematically overestimated, high estimates could be revised
downward.)
Case of error that individuals can predict. Now suppose that, at the time
individuals choose their level of labor effort, they know exactly what the
15Increasingerror does not refer to absolute magnitude; thus, a negative
error that becomes, smaller in magnitude is a case of increasing error.
7.government's error will be. (For example, depreciation schedules and other
rules concerning deductions, which are inaccurate in particular cases, are
known by taxpayers in advance; also, taxpayers may know their ability to hide
income.) In particular, suppose that the error is e(y). Individuals' first-
order condition becomes
(4) y —1-t(l+e')'
As before, the magnitude of the error is not important, but rather how it
changes with income. If the error is increasing (decreasing) with income, the
distortion will be larger (smaller) than otherwise. For example, if
depreciation rules allow deductions that are excessive in an amount
proportional to the scope of the activity, the error is falling. (It is
negative and increasing in magnitude with .2.) Such an error would tend to
offset the labor-leisure distortion.
Because anticipated error creates a distortion in the presence of an
existing distortion, it is useful to inquire whether the interaction of the
two is likely to affect directly how one should assess accuracy. A simple
example suggests that, as a rough approximation, accuracy can be considered
independently. Begin with the familiar rule that distortion (implicitly
assuming perfect accuracy) is proportional to Now, assume that half of
taxpayers anticipate an error in assessed tax equal to the fraction e of
income and half anticipate an error of -e. In this case, the distortion would
be proportional to .S(t+e)2 + .5(t-e)2 —t2+ e2: inaccuracy causes a
distortion proportional to the square of the error, independent of the level
of the preexisting tax. (If the error were a proportion of the tax, say et,
as in the depreciation example, then the distortion due to the error would be
e2t2, which does depend on the preexisting tax.)
16 This rule is a linearapproximation for small t, measuring labor at the
undistorted level. See Browning (1987). If elasticity were falling quickly
as t rises, marginal deadweight loss could fall with the tax rate, as in
Stialitz's (1982) discussion of randomization prior to individuals' labor
decisions. With the preferences and technology in this model, marginal
deadwei;ht loss indeed rises with the tax rate (and for some technologies --
e.g..,yçi) —2e, nE (0,1) --atan increasing rate). For present purposes,
the detail is less important than the general phenomenon.
-8-Remark: When assessing distribution, an inaccurate income tax occupied a
position between that of a perfect tax and a uniform lump-sum tax (which makes
no effort to differentiate tax burdens based on income), Incentive effects
are different in two respects. First, the tax system that makes no effort to
measure income --thelump-sum tax -- isbest with regard to incentives.
Second, intermediate points, as with an inaccurate income tax, can be worse
than both extremes. Just as a system in which rates vary ever time tends to
cause more distortion than one with unchanging rates•'7 so a system in which
effective tax rates vary across similarly situated individuals will cause more
distortion. Such inefficiency can arise by design -- aswhen depreciation
rules are created to provide more generous treatment for equipment than
structures -.oras a result of inaccuracy -- aswhen rules embody
approximations or when assessments of particular cases involve error of a sort
that is predictable at the time individuals decide how much income to earn.
2.3. Distribution and Incentive Effects Combined
A complete analysis would involve modifying the standard optimal income
tax problem to incorporate inaccuracy, which would be a rather complex
undertaking. Nonetheless, it seems that the two features analyzed in this
section would arise in a similar manner, the magnitude of effects depending on
the marginal tax rate applicable to a given income level.'8 For example, if
an individual, knows that his income will be overstated by some fraction, his
work effort will be distorted more and the tax he pays will overstate his
actual income, producing a less desirable distribution of income. The primary
complication is that, for the case in which an individual knows there is
inaccuracy but cannot predict the particular error that will be made in
See Barro (1979).
18Mirrlees(1971) indicates that the optimal income tax may be approximately
linear, consistent with the present model, If marginal rates varied with
income, the analysis would be somewhat more complex for errors large enough to
have a significant effect on the applicable tax rate. Also, if the dejree of
inaccuracy were large, the optimal tax schedule might change in ways that
would complicate the comparison. Finally, observe that with regard to the
measurement of the income of taxable corporations -- whichinvolves
significant complexity and compliance costs -- theincentives analysis alone
would be most relevant (as owners of corporations would be approximately risk-
neutral with regard to tax uncertainty, which is nonsystematic risk).
.9.assessing his own income, the uncertainty will have an effect on labor effort,
which may be favorable or unfavorable (as discussed further in subsection
3.1).
Observe that the effect of inaccuracy on incentives may reduce the degree
of inequity from what otherwise would result. Thus, if behavior were fixed,
an individual's whose income wilt be overstated will pay more tax than others
with similar income, giving rise to inequity. But, when he reduces his work
effort, he reduces his observed income, thereby reducing the inequity. Given
his actual, new level of income, some inequity will remain.19
3. taxpayers' Incentives to Acquire and Present Information
about Taxable Income
Due to the complexity of the income tax and the activity it governs,
taxpayers may be uncertain about their taxable income at the time they decide
on their actions (e.g., whether to work more) or at the time they must file
their tax return. In addition, they may need assistance (e.g., from a lawyer)
to convince the tax authority that their taxable income is lower than the
amount that has been assessed. Because significant resources are expended on
such matters, it is important to determine whether the private value of
information or assistance diverges systematically from its social value. One
might suspect that private incentives tend to be excessive, since the
taxpayer's gain is the treasury's loss. While sometimes this is true, the
analysis is more complicated and depends on the context and assumptions about
the nature of uncertainty.
3.1. Informatien about Taxable Income Used to Decide Upon Labor Effort
Individuals are risk—neutral. When individuals are uncertain about the
taxable income resulting from their efforts, they will find it advantageous to
'Onecan construct examples in which inaccuracy would lead only to
inefficiency. Bradford (1986) offers the situation in which failure to permit
legitimate home office deductions will lead, in equilibrium, to a switch to
production by those who would use ordinary offices, equalizing rates of return
between the two modes of production. In most instances, however, individuals'
costs and productivity of home offices would vary across a continuum. Thus,
in the resulting equilibrium, there would be some individuals who continue to
work in their homes. Their behaviormay be unaffected, while their taxable
income would overstate their actual income.
10acquire information before they act, so that they can adjust their effort in
light of what they learn. Individuals who learn that the marginal after-tax
return is higher than their prior estimate will work harder; those who learn
that the return is lower will work less. (Such decisions may often be
discrete, as in choosing occupations or deciding whether to operate a second
business from one's home.) In both instances there is an externality:
individuals who work harder (less) pay more (less) taxes, so the private
benefit of becoming informed will be less (more) than the social benefit. Two
types of uncertainty will be examined.
First, assume that individuals are uncertain about taxable income because
they are uncertain about true income.20 (The model also can be interpreted as
applying to the case in which individuals are uncertain about the tax rate.21)
In particular, if work effort is .2, utility is y(I)(l+e)(l-t) ..1with
probability .5 and y(2)(l-e)(l-t) -2with probability .5. Uninformed
individuals have expected after-tax- income of yCE)(l-t), so the first-order
condition for 2 is given by (3). as in the case in which there is no
uncertainty. If an individual becomes informed, his first-order condition is
- (l-t)(l+e)
if he learns l+e (i.e., that income will be high), which involves an increase
in work effort and thus in tax revenue. The first-order condition is given by
the same expression, substituting -e for e, if he learns l-e, which involves a
reduction in work effort and revenue. To allow further interpretation, assume
that y —P,where a e (0,1) -- i.e.,income generation is subject to
diminishing returns or effort has an increasing marginal cost measured in
utility (i.e., 2 is measured in utils rather than, say, hours). Using (5), it
can be demonstrated that
20Muchtax compliance effort involves recordkeeping and computation that is
similar to what one might do simply to keep track of one's activities. If
calculations are made in advance -- orused to make decisions in future years
--thenefforts to determine true taxable income and to determine true actual
income will tend to be one and the same. This overlap has been noted by those
attempting to measure tax compliance costs. See Slemrod and Sorum (1984).
In this case, utility would be y(.2)(l-t(l-t)) -2or y(2)(l-t(l+)) - 2.
If one defines e —tt/(l-t),the model is identical to that in the text.
11 -(6) y —Ia(l-t)(l+e)1
when the error is e, and similarly for -e. Thus, when a — individuals who
learn that the truth is l+e (i.e., they underestimated income) increase their
net income (and thus revenue) by the same amount that individuals who learn
that the truth is 1-e reduce their income (and thus revenue). Because the
expected effect on revenue is zero, the private value of acquiring such
information will just equal its social value. But when a > d2y/de2 > 0, so
the increase in income (and revenue) when individuals learn 1-i.e exceeds the
decrease when they learn l-e. As a result, the social value of information
exceeds the private value. These results reverse when a C There is no
guarantee, therefore, that the private and social values of information are
equal. In the absence of particular information about how income is affected
by effort, there is no a priori basis for expecting any particular divergence.
Second, consider the case in which individuals know true income but are
uncertain about taxable income because they are not aware of the particular
idiosyncrasies of the tax process. (For example, there may be standard
accounting rules or depreciation schedules that are correct on average, but
informed taxpayers may learn whether their effective marginal tax rate is
above or below the stated rate.) Errors as before involve over- or
understating income by a factor of e, each with equal probability, If
individuals are risk-neutral, their behavior when uninformed will again be
unaffected by the prospect of error (which has a zero expected value), with
the first-order condition being given by (3). If they learn about the true
error, their first-order condition is
(7) y' —l-t-e
when they learn that their effective tax rate is t-i.e and similarly for t-e.
Then, the distortion will tend to be proportional to t2 + e2 rather than t2.
Thus, the social value of information is negative. The private value, in
contrast, is positive, so the incentive to learn of the tax system's
idiosyncrasies cx ante is unanibiguously excessive.
-12Individuals are risk—averse. Begin with the second case, in which
individuals know their true income but are uncertain about taxable income.
The effect of acquiring information can be decomposed (hypothetically) into
three steps: (1) uninformed individuals buy actuarially fair insurance against
their uncertain tax liability and do not change behavior; (2) such individuals
adjust their work effort to reflect the fact that they no longer face
uncertainty; (3) individuals are told of the error applicable to them, and
make a further adjustment in work effort. The third element is precisely that
just analyzed when individuals were assumed to be risk-neutral; it involves an
excessive private incentive to acquire information. The first element
involves solely the elimination of risk; the private and social values of this
are equal, so no divergence arises on this account. The second element is
ambiguous. When the risk individuals bear changes, their work effort may
rise or fall.22 As in previous cases, changing work effort involves an
externality since individuals ignore government revenue. Unless eliminating
uncertainty, viewed in isolation, would raise work effort substantially, the
net effect is that the private incentive to acquire information would be
excessive in this case.
For the first case above, in which individuals' uncertainty concerned true
income, the result was ambiguous when individuals were assumed to be risk-
neutral. The decomposition into the three elements would be the same as for
the second case. The difference in result is that, because the expected
behavioral effect from the third element is ambiguous, the overall affect is
ambiguous even when the second element concerning the effect of risk is
insignificant.
22Inthis model, one can let an individual's total utility be given by
U(y(I)(l-t±e)) -£. Comparingthe first-order condition to that when there is
no error (no uncertainty) reveals two effects. First, the average marflnal
utility of income is higher in the uncertainty case, assuming that ti''> 0,
as seems most plausible. Second, when e > 0, the tax system redistributes
income between the two states; more marginal income is earned in the high-
than the low-income state, and marginal utility is less in the high-income
state. Compare Stiglitz (1982). Note that most prior work on randomization
has focused on whether randomization is desirable --thatis, whether there is
an incentive benefit that exceeds the risk-bearing cost. The question here is
whether there is an incentive benefit at all (any risk-bearing effect involves
no private/social divergence), and if not, whether the incentive cost of
uncertainty is greater than the incentive cost associated with individuals
acting upon the tax system's idiosyncrasies.
-13-3.2. Information about Taxable Income Used to Determine How Much Income
to Report
This subsection will consider the case in which individuals' decisions
about labor effort are in the past, and the only question is whether they
should expend resources to report their income more accurately.23 (The ex
ante analysis of the preceding subsection would be relevant to the extent that
individuals acquiring information to file tax returns will be able to use that
information to guide future behavior.2)
Symmetric rewards and penalties. While income tax systems often employ
asymmetric sanctions, under which individuals who underreport are penalized
but individuals who overreport are not rewarded, it is useful to begin with
the analytically simpler case in which rewards and penalties are symmetric.25
Individuals report taxable income r to maximize expected utility
(8) EU(r) —ff(l-p)U(y
-tr)+ pU(y -ti-st(i-r))Jg(i)di,
where i is taxable income with distribution g(i), p is the probability of
audit, and s is the sanction rate. Begin with the case in which s —(l-p)/p,
which implies that individuals' expected payments are unaffected by their
report. (For example, if the probability of audit is .1, individuals who
underreport by I and are audited pay, in addition to the amount t by which
their payment fell short of their obligation, a penalty of 9t; in total, on
underreported income they pay lot when audited and 0 when not audited, for an
23 There are ex ante effects even in this case: as will be discussed, if
individuals will acquire information, the uncertainty of tax liability is
reduced; this may affect work incentives and, as discussed previously, there
can be a divergence between the private and social costs or benefits of such
an effect, This complication will be ignored here.
24 Thus, thepure case of filing advice would arise for items that would not
recur, or when the information is reflected on the tax return but is never
understood by the individual (as might happen when a taxpayer delivers a box
of receipts to a tax preparer and signs the final return without having each
item explained).
25 This case is also of interest becauseusing rewards in addition to
penalties has virtues. As will be seen, compliance may be better for a given
penalty and audit rate and individuals' reports may be such that they bear
less risk. The benefits of rewards in audit schemes (in a context in which
individuals have no uncertainty about the law) are discussed in Moolcherjee and
Png (1989).
-14expected payment of t.) Individuals who are uncertain about their true
taxable income will pay some amount in the range of possibilities. The
optimal report will equate the expected marginal utility of income conditional
upon audit with the marginal utility when there is no audit. For the case of
a symmetric distribution and making the reasonable assumption that u''' >0,
the optimal report will be above the mean, but obviously below the upper bound
of possible i.
Individuals who are risk-averse would report their true taxable income if
they knew what itwas.(This is the only report that entails no risk, and
expected payments are the same for any report.) Expected utility if
information is to be acquired is
(9) EU —5 U(y
-ti)g(i)di.
Given the stated penalty scheme, expected tax payments are the same whether or
not individuals are informed. Thus, the private value of information, the
value of (9) minus that of (8) evaluated at the optimal r, consists entirely
of eliminating risk. This private benefit is also a social benefit, so one
may conclude, roughly,26 that there is no tendency for the private and social
value of information to diverge in this case.
Asnoted,this result depends on the assumption that individuals' expected
taxpayments are the same when uninformed and informed, so there is no
anticipated rise or fall in revenue when individuals acquire information.
The conclusion isnot preciselytrue, because the measures of risk are not
quite the same.Assumingthat taxable income corresponds to a true measure of
income, the actual results when individuals are uninformed and if they become
informed are somewhat better than they anticipate. (For example, individuals
with truly low income, and thus a high marginal utility of income, will be
those who receive rewards whenuninformedand those who, upon learning true
income, would pay less tax,but,by assumption, uninformed individuals with
high marginal utilities of income are not aware that their taxable income will
be at the low end of possibilities.) Expected social welfare is thus higher
than individuals estimate both when they do not acquire information and when
theydo. This in itself does not imply anyprivate/social divergence in the
value of information. There would be a divergence to the extent that these
differences between social welfare and private estimates of expected utility
change when individuals become informed, as they no doubt will. My best
conjecture is that the difference is more likely to be greater when
individuals are uninformed (because the risk involved is greater, as rewards
and penalties are being imposed), suggesting that the private benefit of
informationmay exceed its social value onthis account.
-15-When s C(l-p)/p,informed individuals would underreport income •to some
extent, but reports of uninformed individuals would be lower as well. Most
plausibly, expected underreporting would be greater by the informed.7 Then
there would be a revenue loss that individuals do not take intoaccount, so
the private benefit of information would exceed Its social benefit. (This
result would reversed for the case in which s > (l-p)/p, one that isperverse
in the sense that taxpayers who know their true income would intentionally
overstate it to some extent, thereby incurring risk, since there is an
expected positive reward from doing so.28)
Penalties only. Suppose now that there are penalties for underpayment but
no rewards when overpayments are discovered. The uninformed choose r to
maximize
27Thefirst-order condition for uninformed individuals' choice of r is
5IJ'(t-ti-st(i-r))g(i)di—k-Qutcy
.tr).
The left side is the average marginal utility of income when audited andthe
right side is the marginal utility of income when not audited weighted by an
enforcement factor. For informed individuals, the first-order condition for




When s C (l-p)/p, the factor on the right side of both first-order conditions
exceeds one, indicating that individuals would report less. Begin byassuming
that informed individuals contemplate making the report r* that isoptimal for
the uninformed. Obviously, they wish to raise thisreport when they learn
that i is high and reduce it when they learn that i is low. Ifone makes the
plausible assumption that u''' > 0, it follows that, in making adjustments in
r to produce the optimal r(i), income in states involving audits mustfallby
more for the low marginal utility (high income and thus low taxable income)
states than it rises for high marginal utility states. Since income in the
audit states is linear in reports, reported income similarly must fallmore in
low marginal utility states than it rises in high marginalutility states.
Moreover, the same assumption implies that a given adjustment in reported
income will cause less of a change in the marginal utility of income in the
no-audit state when reported income is reduced than when reported income is
increased, which reinforces the initial effect.
Also, one might expect s < (l-p)/p to be optimal: with respect to the
informed, if s is higher, it will be possible to lower p -- therebysaving audit resources --withoutresulting in compliance costs. (If s —(l-p)/p,a
slight reduction in p slightly reduces compliance, but this would not have a
first-order social cost; if s > (l-p)/p, a slight reduction inp improves
compliance by reducing overreporting.)
-16-r





For a given penalty level, taxpayers will make lower income reports than when
there also were rewards: if taxable income will turn out to be high, a higher
report reduces one's expected penalty, as before, but if taxable income will
be low, a higher report provides only a refund but no reward, so that expected
payments to the treasury for such outcomes are lower the lower is one's
,29
Asbefore, begin with the case in which s —(l-p)/p.Reports of the
uninformed will be above the bottom of the range of possible taxable incomes.
(For s —(l-p)/p,the lowest report in the range minimizes expected payments,
but the derivative of expected payments with respect to the report is zero;
thus, there is no first-order income loss from a slight increase in the report
but a positive benefit from reducing risk.) Informed taxpayers will report
r(i) —i.Information benefits the taxpayer in two ways: they no longer bear
risk, and when taxable income is lower than their report when uninformed they
pay less in the state in which they are not audited. The former benefit is a
social benefit while the latter involves a transfer, so private incentives are
excessive.
When s >(l-p)/p,reports of the uninformed, and thus revenue, are
higher.3° The informed pay the same expected revenue as when s —(l-p)/p,as
in both cases the informed report r(i) —1.Thus, there are larger transfers




which differs from that in the case of symmetric rewards and penalties, see
note 27, only by the fact that the lower limit of integration is r rather than
the lower end of the income range. The r that was optimal in the symmetric
scheme was necessarily above the bottom of the range, so the left side of this
first-order condition is less than that in the symmetric case when evaluated
at that r. To restore equality, the report must be reduced.
-17-in more states, which increases the extent to which private incentives are
excessive.
Finally, if s < (l-p)/p, the most plausible result is that, as in the case
with symmetric rewards and penalties, private incentives will be excessive.
Indeed, there is more of a tendency for private and social incentives to
diverge in the present case. Uninformed individuals wilt report less when
there are no rewards and informed individuals will make the samereports
(because they always underreport, the absence of rewards does not affect their
reports). Thus, obtaining information with penalties only involves a greater
expected transfer from the treasury to the taxpayer.
3.3. Assistance in Demonstrating that an Assessment Is Erroneous
Suppose that taxpayers know their true net income, but that the government
makes assessment errors. Consider the possibility thattaxpayers are able to
demonstrate errors, which involves the cost of effort or legal services.
Taxpayers have an incentive to make such a demonstration only when errors are
unfavorable to them. (The errors can be thought of as those that remain after
the government has made its optimal expenditure in an audit to determinetrue
income.31 Since the taxpayer is assumed to know the truth and has better
access to relevant information, it would often be possible for taxpayers to
correct remaining errors at far less cost than the government could detect
them .32)
Distribution. It is useful first to isolate the distributional effect by
considering the case itt which correction does not affect work effort. A
30 That revenue must begreater can be seen in two steps. First, keeping s —(l.p)/pand raising r increases revenue for states in which taxable income
is low. Second, given the higher r, raising s increasesrevenue for states in
which taxable income is high and there is an audit.
31 The optimalgovernment expenditure in making its initial determination, as
well as the level of taxable income it should deem to exist when it remains
uncertain, depends on how the process of taxpayer appeals functions.
32 One might also beinterested in the government's incentive to expend
resources contesting tax assessments. If one assumes that the enforcer
maximizes revenue, its incentive is clearly excessive. Even if the overall
enforcement budget were limited centrally (see Sanchez and Sobel (l993)J,it
would not be efficient if enforcers allocated their effortsso as to maximize revenue.
18taxpayer's benefit of correcting an adverse error, cy, when the marginal tax
rate is c is eyt; taxpayers would be willing to spend up to this amount to
correct the error. While the average effect of correcting errors would tend
to be positive if the tax rate has been chosen optimally, it remains true that
the fall in revenue is a social cost that taxpayers ignore. Thus, private
incentives clearly are excessive. When the error is small, the social benefit
of correcting the error will be small relative to the amount of the error, so
the problem of excessive incentives will be relatively the greatest. An
appeals process could address such a divergence by disallowing appeals except
when errors were shown to be large.33
Incentives. Individuals' work incentives depend not on the stated tax
rate but rather on what they ultimately expect to pay, which will take into
account any errors that they expect the tax collector to make. Begin with the
case in which the tax collector makes errors that cannot be anticipated. As
discussed previously, such errors do not tend to affect behavior (abstracting
from systematic error, which might be corrected directly, and the possible
effects of randomization on incentives when individuals are risk-averse).
Thus, individuals' efforts cx post to correct such errors will not be socially
valuable.3' Correction will, however, be privately valuable.
Now consider the case in which individuals can anticipate that an adverse
error of e will be made in their case. (Perhaps some legitimate business
expenses that superficially may appear to be personal consumption have a
probability of being denied,) Such a prospect may induce individuals to work
less." The correction of an error adverse to the taxpayer thus has two
" This purely distributive case is analogous to the problem of an insured
individual making expenditures to demonstrate to the insurer that his losses
are greater than an initial ppraisal indicates. Again, there is a
distributive benefit of makin; insurance payments more accurately reflect
losses, but the insured individual ignores ex post the cost of higher
payments, which is reflected in premiums ex ante. This analogous case is
examined in Kaplow (1993).
'Indeed,if the error is unbiased, the prospect of correction by taxpayers
will result in an expected tax rate that is lower than the stated tax rate,
which would be undesirable if the stated tax rate were set optimally. Of
course, stated tax rates might be adjusted to correct for this.
" Since the argument to follow depends on the effect on revenue, it is the
uncompensated labor supply response that is relevant, which is why the
-19external effects: given the level of actual income, the treasury loses; but
the piospect that the error will be corrected may increase work effort, which
benefits the treasury (at the rate t). To illustrate, consider the risk-
neutral case in which utility is given by y(J)(l-t(l+e)) -2and the
technology is V, with a(0, 1). It can be dembnstrated that a marginal
reduction in the error will reduce (increase) revenue if a is less (greater)
than l-t(l+e), in which case the private incentive is excessive (inadequate).
More concretely, a taxpayer's decision to begin moonlighting may be unaffected
by the prospect of an overassessment that will not be corrected or he may be
deterred entirely.
As a final note, observe that, as when only distribution was considered,
taxpayers' incentives to correct small errors will systematically be
excessive. The reason is that, if the tax rate has been optimally set, the
effect on welfare (taking into account work incentive and distributive
concerns) of applying a slightly higher or lower rate will be negligible
relative to the magnitude of the error. The private benefit, however, is
always proportional to the amount of the error. On the other hand, if errors
are sufficiently large and anticipated by taxpayers, taxpayer incentives for
correction will be inadequate. (When errors are large enough and adverse to
taxpayers, the effective tax rate will be so high that reducing it would
increase revenue.)
4. Discussion
Relevance for tax policy. While substantial efforts have been devoted to
analyzing the compliance costs and distorting effects of income taxes and
other tax systems, little attention has been given toassessing whether better
measurement of ability to pay is worth the cost. An exception is Stern
(1982), who compares a nonlinear income tax to a linear income tax (whichmay
be combined with uniform lump-sin grants or taxes) that is far lesscostly to
prospect of losing some deductions and thus facing a higher effective tax rate
need not result in lower work effort. Note also thatany labor supply effect
will be limited to the extent of expenditures to correcterrors. Thus, if an
additional unit of labor will increase tax at the rate t(l+e) if theerror is
uncorrected, with correction the effective rate will be t(l+k(e)), where k(e)
is the cost of correcting the error. This cost will bepositive, although
less than the error; otherwise, it would not be incurred,
-20 -administer because taxes may be collected at the source and problems of income
attribution among individuals and entities are avoided.36 In comparing such
tax systems, it is relevant that most jurisdictions apply some form of sales
taxation -- similarto a linear income tax -- soa substantial portion of the
total costs of a separate income tax system are avoidable. Onesuspectsthat,
in addition to being less costly with regard to compliance, such simpler
schemes would involve greater accuracy in measuring income (as there is
economy of scale in learning rules and developing computational capacity). If
so, the theoretical advantage of a nonlinear income tax may be reduced
substantially when one takes into account its greater inaccuracy and higher
cost.37 Moreover, to the extent recent income tax reforms have resulted in a
more nearly linear income tax, it is less likely that using a separate system
of income taxation would be justified by the redistributive benefits it
uniquely can provide.
The costs and benefits of accuracy are also relevant when considering
myriad tax rules that refine the definition of income. It is often apparent
that a more complex rule is more precise, but there is rarely any attempt to
identify, much less quantify, the benefit of such precision, making it
virtually impossible to assess the rule in light of greater compliance and
administrative costs. The present study seeks to improve the prospects for
policy analysis by offering a method for evaluating the potential benefits of
greater accuracy.
This investigation also examines the extent to which taxpayers will choose
to become informed about their taxable income and the efforts they will
undertake to contest government assessments. Examining these aspects of tax
compliance serve as a reminder that more accurate tax provisions, which
taxpayers find more complex, ,will not automatically have their desired
But there would be little resulting simplification for the self-employed,
where income tax compliance costs are the greatest. See Slenrod and Sorum
(1984).
As first suggested by Mirrlees (1971), it may be that the optimal
nonlinear income tax is approximately linear in any event. Stern (1982) finds
a nonlinear tax to be significantly advantageous, but in a model with only two
ability levels rather than acontinuum.
21 -consequences (as taxpayers may not take them into account) and will involve
additional costs when they do. Moreover, there is no guarantee that taxpayers
will make socially optimal decisions in acquiring information and contesting
assessments. In many instances, it appears that incentives are excessive, so
compliance and administrative costs will be too large. As a result, more
complicated provisions may be less desirable than otherwise, and it may be
appropriate to consider policies designed to reduce taxpayers' incentives to
acquire tax advice.36
Sources of inaccuracy in income taxation. Much discussion of complexity
and inaccuracy in the income tax has focused on the difficulty of itemizing
deductions. Yet a much larger share of the compliance costs of filing returns
(of which recordkeeping is the largest component) and presumably many costs in
planning one's affairs involve determining the revenues and costs of income-
producing activity. (Indeed, self-employed individuals have much higher
compliance costs, and the cost of determining net gains and losses from
investment activity is another substantial component of the total burden.
Also, much complexity concerns the time at which income or deductions accrue,
an issue that usually relates to income-producing activity.)3 For this
reason, the present investigation has focused on determinations involving net
income.
Tax evasion is another major source of inaccuracy, responsible forcausing
many individuals' assessed tax to differ substantially from the tax due on
their true income. While tax evasion was not considered directly here, much
of the analysis is applicable to it. Specifically, areas of successful tax
evasion can be viewed as cases in which taxpayers know in advance that a
favorable error will be made. If the nominal tax rate must be increased,
Da For example, tax advice isa deductible expense in the U.S. income tax
system; this tax benefit could be eliminated. (Changes in the 1986 tax reform
effectively make this deduction available to fewer taxpayers.)
" See Arthur D. Little(1988), Slemrod and Sorum (1984). In the Arthur D.
Little study, it was found that two-third's of total compliance timewas
incurred by businesses. For partnerships and S-corporations, the issues would
be analogous to those arising for sole proprietors(ordinary self-employed
individuals). For taxable corporations, such costs determinecorporate income and corporate tax, which is an importantcomponent of the system for taxing investment returns.
-22-others pay more tax than otherwise, which they know in advance. This sort of
inaccuracy was shown to have adverse distributional, and incentive effects.
Thus, when considering the benefits of enhanced tax enforcement,, the benefits
of enhanced compliance can be much greater than indicated by confining
attention to revenue alone (the benefit of which, in terms of socialwelfare,
must account for the fact that greater revenue involves a transfer).'°
In addition, the income tax often is inaccurate by design, as when tax
expenditures are used to encourage various activities. In such cases, what
have here been characterized as adverse incentive effects may be viewedas
desirable results, although it remains true that there will be distributive
costs. (The problem is not the conventional argument that tax expenditures
favor the rich because exclusions and deductions are worth more to those
facing higher marginal rates, for their marginal rates can be adjusted to take
this into account. Rather, individuals with different opportunities toengage
in favored activities will have tax burdens that less accurately reflect their
true income.)
Different welfare criteria. The analysis relied on the utilitarian
welfare criterion that is typically used in examining costs from distorting
incentives. When evaluating distributive effects, more egalitarian norms are
often considered. In the present context, a welfare function that showed a
stronger preference for equality would indicate that accuracy was more
valuable. In the extreme case of maximin and errors that result in
overassessnents on the poor, it would in principle be appropriate to expend
massive resources to eliminate error.1 Similarly, greater preferences for
equality in outcomes would imply that individuals should devote more resources
to resolving uncertainty than they would choose (even when there are no
external benefits). An ex ante perspective, however, would use individuals'
'°Thedistinction between maximizing revenue and welfare is noted in the
literature on complexity and uncertainty cited in note 9 and emphasized in
other work.
• Compare Stern's (1982) analysis, in whicheven modest errors in assessing
luni -sum taxes would render them undesirable (compared to a nonlinear income
tax' if such errors involvedoverassessnent of the poor and the welfare
function were sufficiently egalitarian.
-23-own risk premiums to determine the effect of uncertainty on their welfare in
which case the previous analysis would be unaffected by the degree of
preference for equality.
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